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Grove: The Billion Dollar Benzene Blunder: Supreme Court Scrutinizes OSH

THE BILLION DOLLAR BENZENE BLUNDER:
SUPREME COURT SCRUTINIZES OSHA
STANDARDS IN INDUSTRI4L UNION
DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO v.
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE
[WIhen discharging his duties under the [Occupational
Safety and Health Act], the Secretary is well admonished to
remember that a heavy responsibility burdens his authority.
Inherent in this statutory scheme is authority to refrain from
regulation of insignificant or de minimis risks. When the administrative record reveals only scant or minimal risk of material health impairment, responsible administration calls for
avoidance of extravagant, comprehensive regulation. Perfect
safety is a chimera; regulation must not strangle human activity in the search for the impossible.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Independent regulatory agencies, 2 such as the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, 3 are designed to promulgate safety standards' for the public's protection. Yet, for industry, public safety regulations have become overly burdensome.' The scope and impact of
administrative regulations upon commercial enterprise have become
1. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2875
(1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted), aj'g in part sub nom. American Petroleum
Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978).
2. UNITED STATES GOV'T MANUAL, 495-705 (1980-1981), lists and describes 55 independent
government agencies.
3. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) derives its authority from
the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
4. Such standards are accorded the force of law. Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United
States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1974). The Act imposes on every employer a
duty to comply with occupational safety and health standards or face civil and criminal penalties
under 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
5. In order to effect its desired reach, Congress determined that job-related injury and illness imposed a substantial burden on interstate commerce and therefore the Act applies to all
employment performed in a business affecting commerce among the several states. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 651 (1976). Current estimates place four million businesses and fifty-seven million employees
within reach of the Act. Employees who are covered by other federal job safety programs are
excluded. E.g., The Coal Mines Health & Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801, 811 (1976). See
Cohen, The OccupationalSafety andHealth,4ct:A LaborLawyer's Overview, 33 OHI ST. L.. 788
(1972).
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the subject of serious inquiry on judicial review.6
This note analyzes the Supreme Court's recent precedential deciUnion Department,AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
sion in Industrial
Institute.7 For the first time, the Court scrutinized the type of stan-

dards OSHA is authorized to promulgate and intimated that reviewing
courts should require OSHA to conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis

prior to implementing regulatory action. Although the traditional
scope of judicial review of an agency regulation may not have changed
with this decision,' the Supreme Court has required greater scrutiny in

assessing the propriety of OSHA's actions than ever before.
This note begins with an historical perspective of OSHA's

rulemaking authority and the judiciary's intrusion upon it. Attention is
directed to the Supreme Court's decision in Industrial Union Department, analyzing the Court's holding and demonstrating how the decision corresponds to and deviates from prior decisions. Finally, the
future implications of Industrial Union Department are discussed.
II.

PROCEDURAL DIRECTIVES

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19709 was designed to
6. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
grantedJudgment vacated, sub nom. Cotton Warehouse Ass'n v. Marshall, 101 S. Ct. 56 (1981);
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 38
(1980); Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir.
1978); American Fed'n of Labor v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975); Synthetic Organic
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974); Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974); Associated Indus. Inc. v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973).
7. 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980) (Per Justice Stevens, with three Justices joining and one Justice
concurring in judgment), aFginpartsub nom. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493
(5th Cir. 1978).
8. For comments on judicial review of agency rulemaking, see Handler, A Rebuttak The
Needfor a Scientific Base/or Government Regulation, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 808 (1975); Williams, "HybridRulemaking" Under the AdministrativeProcedureAct: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysir, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401 (1975); Wright, New Judicial Requisites/or Informal Rulemaking:
Implicationsfor the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 29 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1977);
Wright, The Courtsand the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of JudicialReview, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 375 (1974); Comment, JudicialReviewof In/ormalRulemaking Procedure: W"en May Something More FormalBe Required? 27 AM. U.L. REV. 781 (1978); Note, JudicialReview Under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act: The Substantial Evidence Test as Applied to Informal
Rulemaking, 1974 DUKE L.J. 459; Note, The JudicialRole in Defining ProceduralRequirementsfor
Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L. REV. 782 (1974).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). See generally B. FELLNER & D. SAVELSON, OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH-LAW AND PRACTICE (1976); M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH LAW (1978); R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: ITS GOALS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS (1976); Cohen, supra note 5; Spann, The New OccupationalSafety andHealthAct,
58 A.B.A.J. 255 (1972); Taylor, Reasonable Rulemaking Under OSHA: Is it Feasible?, 9 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 215 (1977); White & Carney, OSHA Comes of Age: The Law of the Work Place
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give the Secretary of Labor the authority to promulgate standards to
ensure employee protection in the workplace.'" In doing so, the Secretary was empowered to promulgate regulations using the process of
"informal" or "notice-and-comment" rulemaking."
In promulgating regulations, the Secretary of Labor must follow
the procedural directives outlined in the Occupational Safety and
Health Act.' 2 On the basis of his own independent investigation, the
Secretary must determine whether a regulation should be promulgated
in order to ensure a safe place of employment.' 3 He may receive the
assistance and recommendations of an advisory committee in making
this determination. 4 Once the determination is made, the proposed
regulation must be published in the Federal Register and all interested
persons allowed thirty days to comment in writing and to request a
public hearing.'" Upon receiving any objections to the regulation, the
Secretary must set a date and place for a public hearing and publish
this information in the Federal Register. 6 Within sixty days following
the hearing, or within sixty days after the period for filing comments if
no hearing is requested, the Secretary will promulgate the regulation by
publishing it in the 7Federal Register accompanied by a statement of
supporting reasons.

Environment, 28 Bus. LAW. 1309 (1973); Comment, The OccupationalSafely and Health Ac of
1970: An Overview, 4 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 525 (1974); Comment, The Occupational Safeqy and
HealthAct, 34 LA. L. REV. 102 (1973).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976). "The term 'occupational safety and health standard' means a
standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
employment and places of employment." Id.
i1. It has been widely assumed by legal scholars that "formal" or "on-the-record" rulemaking is inefficient, expensive and unduly burdensome to administrative agencies. Informal
rulemaking is seen as efficient and inexpensive. See K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
SEVENTIES §§ 6.01 to .01-1 (1976); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15 (Supp. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as DAVIS TREATISE]; Hamilton, Procedures/orthe Adoption ofRules of General
Applicability: The Need/or ProceduralInnovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV.
1276, 1315 (1972); Robinson, The Making ofAdministrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking
and Adjudication and Administrative ProcedureReform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1970); Verkuil,
JudicialReview ofInformal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
13. Id. § 655(b)(1).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 655(b)(2)-(3). See also Pactra Indus. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 555
F.2d 677, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1977).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(3) (1976).
17. Id. § 655(e).
This requirement is designed to serve several general functions: it provides an internal
check on arbitrary agency action by insuring that prior to taking action an agency can
clearly articulate the reasons for its decision; it makes possible informed public criticism
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The federal courts have recently faced an onslaught of cases seeking judicial review of administrative determinations regarding the public's protection from hazardous substances. 18 Many times, the exposure
effects from such substances are not precisely known, and the Secretary
must formulate a regulation on the basis of a judgment call. The "substantial evidence" test' 9 is easily applicable when the Secretary's record
is subject to factual verification. The reviewing court merely ensures
that he has not acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The test is more difficult to apply when the regulation is not based on empirically verifiable
data but rather on speculative research and development from which a
policy determination has, by necessity, been made.2" History reveals
that, in the latter case, the reviewing court's scope of intrusion is
unclear. 2' Nevertheless, reviewing courts, using the substantial eviof a decision by making known its underlying rationale; and it facilitates judicial review
of agency action by providing an important part of the record of the decision.
Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 105 (3d Cir. 1973). But see id. at 110
(McLaughlin J., dissenting). "If we were to try and force the Secretary to issue an exhaustive
statement explaining and supporting his motives, the Emergency Temporary Standard would become an ineffective mechanism." Id.
The requirements of a statement of reasons were established in Industrial Union Dep't, AFLCIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
What we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary, when his
proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons why he chooses to follow one course
rather than another. Where that choice purports to be based on the existence of certain
determinable facts, the Secretary must, in form as well as substance, find those facts from
evidence in the record. By the same token, when the Secretary is obliged to make policy
judgments where facts alone do not provide the answer, he should so state and go on to
identify the considerations he found persuasive.
Id. at 475. Cf. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (dealing with environmental regulations under the Clean Air Act).
18. American Fed'n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. grantedjudgment vacated, sub noma. Cotton Warehouse Ass'n v. Marshall, 101 S. Ct. 56 (1981); American Iron
& Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509
F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975); Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfrs, Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d
Cir. 1974); Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.
1974); Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973). See generally
Bergin & Riskin, Economic and TechnologicalFeasibilityin Regulating Toxic Substances under the
OccupationalSafety and Health Act, 7 ECOL. L. QUARTERLY 285 (1978); McGarity, Substantive
andProceduralDiscretion in AdministrativeResolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). "The determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." Id See also Verkuil,
supra note 11, at 185.
20. "How a reviewing court applies the substantial evidence test in reviewing quasilegislative informal rule making is an intriguing problem which is just beginning to generate what
will prove to be ... an extensive literature." Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan,
503 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1974).
21. See notes 146-52 infra and accompanying text.
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dence standard of review, have looked into two principal areas. First,
the courts have examined the nature of the risk involved to ensure that
the Secretary of Labor has identified a socially unacceptable, or unreasonable health or safety risk prior to proposing any regulatory action.2 2
The Secretary is not authorized to promulgate a standard unless it
would result in improved health or safety. 23 Second, even if the regulation appears to be an effective way to reduce the identified risk, the
courts have asked whether the regulation is both technologically and
economically feasible. 4
A.

The SubstantialEvidence Test
1. Application to Cases Involving Verifiable Facts

In Pactfic States Box & Basket Co. v. White,2 5 Justice Brandeis set
out the presumption theory of administrative review. "Where the regulation is within the scope of authority legally delegated, thepresumption of the existence of facts justifying its specific exercise attaches alike
to statutes, to municipal ordinances, and to orders of administrative

bodies. ' ' 26 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in AssociatedIndustries,
Inc. v. United States Department of Labor, 7 rejected the presumption
theory, and adopted the substantial evidence standard of review for
OSHA regulations. The court concluded that, "when the Department
[of Labor] imposes a standard. . . it has an obligation to produce some

evidence justifying its action.

28

22. See notes 59-72 infra and accompanying text.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976). See also American Fed'n of Labor v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109
(3d cir. 1975).
24. See notes 73-89 infra and accompanying text.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act envisions a two-step process to set standards.
First, the agency must ascertain whether a risk to employees from a toxic chemical exists.
If such a risk exists the industry must reduce that risk to the extent economically and
technologically feasible regardless of the marginal health benefits ofrisk reduction. This
standard of action implies that OSHA should only be concerned with costs to the employer when the cost of compliance is likely to drive a substantial number of employers
out of business. Except for this outer limit, Congress was more concerned with employee
safety than it was with employer expense.
McGarity, supra note 18, at 787.
25. 296 U.S. 176 (1935). See also United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S.
742 (1972); United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940); Assigned Car Cases, 274
U.S. 564 (1927). One of the first attempts to develop higher standards for informal rulemaking
can be seen in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dealing
with E.P.A. denial of application under the Clean Air Act). See also Verkuil, supra note I1, at
206.
26. 296 U.S. at 186 (emphasis added).
27. 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973).
28. Id. at 352-53.
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In quantifying the amount of evidence needed to sustain the standard, the court referred to the test established in an earlier case, Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board.29

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. . . . It must be
enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct
a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is
one of fact for the jury.3"
In justifying the departure from Justice Brandeis's view in PacificStates

Box, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Associated Industries recounted the historical background of the substantial evidence standard

of review for OSHA regulations.3 ' The original senate bill containing
the informal rulemaking provisions, now a part of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, was silent on the scope of judicial review. The
House amended the bill to provide for formal, rather than informal
rulemaking. The Senate then agreed to incorporate the substantial evi-

dence standard of review as a tradeoff for the House's abandoning its
insistence on formal rulemaking which would automatically have in-

voked this test.32 The result was an anomalous, informal rulemaking
procedure triggering a formal standard of review.3 3 Yet, the substantial

evidence standard of review was intended to be an important safeguard
against arbitrariness or irrationality in informal rulemaking. As the
court in Associated Industries articulated, such a standard of review

would ensure that an agency would act with discriminating awareness
of the consequences of its action.3 4
29. 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950), rev'd, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See also National Labor Relations Bd. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Corn Products Co. v. Department of Health,
Education & Welfare, F.D.A., 427 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1970).
30. 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951). Professor Jaffe equated the concept of substantial evidence with
the concept of fairness.
I would suggest ... that underlying the vexed word "substantial," ... coming as it does
from a spectrum of words such as "scintilla," "preponderance" and "weight," connotes
the mechanics of judging.... I would say then, that the judge may-indeed mustreverse if as he conscientiously sees it the finding is not fairly supported by the record; or
to phrase it more sharply, the judge must reverse if he cannot conscientiously escape the
conclusion that the finding is unfair.
Jaffe, JudicialReview." "SubstantialEvidence on the Whole Record," 64 HARV. L. REV. 1233, 1239
(1951).
31. 487 F.2d 342, 348-51 (2d Cir. 1973).
32. Id. at 348-49.
33. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
34. 487 F.2d at 354 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 174
(1962)).
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Although the court in AssociatedIndustries adopted the "substantial evidence" standard of review for OSHA regulations, it concluded

that this review entailed no more or less than assessing whether the
Secretary of Labor, in promulgating an OSHA regulation, acted arbi-

trarily or capriciously." The court pointed out that there is really only
a semantic difference between the "substantial evidence" standard and
the traditional "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review of an

agency action. If a regulation36is not supported by substantial evidence,
it is arbitrary and capricious.

2. Application to Cases Involving Policy Considerations
Associated Industries is illustrative of the application of the sub-

stantial evidence test to the promulgation of standards concerning identified hazards, "the evidence [being] such that the task consisted
primarily of evaluating the data and drawing conclusions from it." 3
The courts, however, have had difficulty applying this test to OSHA

regulations predicated on legislative-type policy decisions. 38 The difficulty, as Judge McGowan addressed it in Industrial Union Department,
AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,3 9 has stemmed from the legislative compromise

that ultimately led to the statutory scope of review of OSHA actions."
35. 487 F.2d at 349.
36. Id. at 349-50. Contra, Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1969), where the
court concluded:
While the agency action which is arbitrary and capricious, or which constitutes an
abuse of discretion, would no doubt be action which is "unsupported by substantial evidence," the reverse is not true. In other words, even where the agency action is not
arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion, there may still not be "substantial
evidence" in the accepted use of that test to justify the agency action. The very listing of
the substantial evidence as a separate and alternative ground for reviewing agency action
indicates a legislative intent that it be a different standard from that permitting the setting aside of the findings or conclusions of an agency as arbitrary, capricious or an abuse
of discretion.
Id. at 398. In American Fed'n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the court held
that the substantial evidence test "provides for more rigorous scrutiny than the usual 'arbitrary
and capricious' test .... " Id. at 649. See also WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968); DAvis TREATISE, supra note 11, § 29.02; Scalia & Goodman, Procedura/Aspectsofthe Consumer ProductSafetyAct, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 899, 935 (1973).
37. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
38. E.g., Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfgs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1158-60 (3d
Cir. 1974); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 127-29 (5th Cir.
1974); Associated Indus. Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 347-50 (2d Cir. 1973).
39. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
40. Id. at 469-70.
This direct review proceeding presents a classic case of what Judge Friendly has
aptly termed "a new form of uneasy partnership" between agency and court that results
whenever Congress delegates decision making of a legislative character to the one, sub-
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This has forced the courts to use the substantial evidence standard, a

test created for the review of formal rulemaking, to review legislativelike determinations made in informal agency proceedings. In many instances, the courts have been ill-equipped to deal with this task.
Hodgson involved a challenge to the Secretary's promulgation of
complex scientific standards lacking sufficient quantitative data to support them. The court concluded that in a case involving complex scientific standards such as this, "[D]ecision making must . . . depend to a

greater extent upon policy judgments and less upon purely factual
analysis."'" Thus, the court held that where the reliability of research

and data in a new area was questionable, the agency had to employ
broad discretion to formulate appropriate regulations to the best of its
ability on the basis of the available data.42 The court further stated that
in cases where legislative determinations were involved, the scope of
review, although no less exacting in scrutiny, ensured that the agency

had not acted arbitrarily or irrationally.43
Many cases seeking judicial review of policy decisions resulted

from promulgation of OSHA regulations based on the results of tests of
laboratory animals." The court in Dry Color ManufacturersAssociation v. Department of Labor45 noted that "substantial evidence" must

necessarily be determined by the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

6

In Dry Color, a temporary emergency standard regulating

human exposure to suspected chemical carcinogens was vacated for
lack of substantial evidence. The Secretary of Labor, in setting the

human exposure limits, had extrapolated data from animal experiments to establish a sufficient probability of a cancer hazard to man.
ject to review by the other. . . . The angularity of this relationship is only sharpened
when, as here, Congress-with no apparent awareness of anomaly-has explicitly combined an informal agency procedure with a standard of review traditionally conceived of
as suited to formal adjudication or rulemaking. The federal courts, hard pressed as they
are by the flood of new tasks imposed upon them by Congress, surely have some claim to
be spared additional burdens deriving from the illogic of legislative compromise.
id. at 469.
41. Id. at 474. See also Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 811 (1968).
42. In Hodgson, the court felt that judicial restraint should be exercised. "We think it
equally the part of wisdom and restraint on our part to show a comparable flexibility, and to be
always mindful that at least some legislative judgments cannot be anchored securely and solely in
demonstrable fact." 499 F.2d at 476.
43. Id. at 475 (quoting Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338
(D.C. Cir. 1968)).
44. E.g., Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfgs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974);
Dry Color Mfgs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973).
45. 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973).
46. "The amount and quality of the evidence necessary to provide 'substantial' support for
such a finding will necessarily vary depending on the facts of each case." Id. at 104.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss2/5

8

Grove: The Billion Dollar Benzene Blunder: Supreme Court Scrutinizes OSH
[Vol. 16:252
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

Although the court acknowledged that the Secretary had no affirmative
obligation under the substantial evidence test to promulgate a standard
based on "absolute certainty" of a chemical causing human cancer, the
court did state that the substantial evidence test required "more than
some possibility" of the chemical producing this result.47
Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Brennan4 8 provides a further illustration of the substantial evidence test's
applicability to cases involving policy considerations. In this case, the
only available evidence demonstrated that the chemical ethyleneimine
caused cancer in rats and mice. Yet, the court held that the Secretary
of Labor properly weighed this evidence in determining the limits of
safe human exposure. 49 The court reasoned that once a chemical is
found to be carcinogenic in experimental animals, the Secretary has
two alternatives: either find the chemical carcinogenic to man, or find
it non-carcinogenic to man, until contrary evidence is produced.50 In
Chemical Manufacturers, the court concluded that it would be "improper to afford less protection to workers when exposed to substances
found to be carcinogenic only in experimental animals," and it opted
for the second alternative. 5 ' The court believed that the Secretary's determination in such a case was a quasi-legislative one which did not
require absolute judicial deference but which did demand some consistency between the standard and OSHA's enabling legislation.5"
Chemical.Manufacturerssummarized previous holdings and established the following seemingly algebraic five-step standard of judicial
review:
(1) [Determine] whether the Secretary's notice of proposed
rulemaking adequately informed interested persons of
the action taken;
(2) [Determine] whether the Secretary's promulgation adequately sets forth reasons for his action;
47. Id.
48. 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974).
49. The court acknowledged the difficulty of attempting to measure a legislative policy decision against a factual yardstick, and indicated that in such cases deference should be granted to
the Secretary's decision. "We hold that there does exist substantial evidence in the record as a
whole to support the Secretary's finding that El is carcinogenic in rats and mice and in the absence
of evidence of carcinogenicity in humans, the Secretary properly weighed the only available alternatives." Id. at 1158, 1160-61.
50. Id. at 1159.
51. Id. (quoting the Secretary's statement of reasons for the regulation).
52. Id See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
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[Determine] whether the statement of reasons reflects
consideration of factors relevant under the statute;
(4) [Determine] whether presently available alternatives
were at least considered; and
(5) [Determine] 4f the Secretary's determination is based in
whole or in part onfactualmatters subject to evidentiary
(3)

in the record
development, whether substantial evidence
53
as a whole supports the determination.
B.

The Nature of the Risk to be Remedied

The most recent case dealing with the review of an OSHA regulation governing the handling of a toxic substance is American Iron &
Steel Institute v. OSHA .4 This case dealt with a rule promulgated by
the Secretary of Labor which limited human exposure to a suspected

carcinogen in the absence of supporting scientific data. The court distinguished determinations based on fact from those, as in the present
case, based on non-factual, legislative-type policy decisions." While
the former determinations were reviewable under the substantial evidence test, the latter determinations were reviewable under a "reasoned
decision" standard,5 6 one which was "free from nagging doubt" about
the rationale of the Secretary's decision. 7

The scope of judicial review in cases involving the Secretary of
Labor's policy determinations must be broad enough to ensure that the
determination reflects a "reasoned decision."' 58 This necessitates an assessment of the nature of the risk involved, for the Secretary lacks the
authority to promulgate a regulation in the absence of a reasonable risk
53. 503 F.2d at 1160 (emphasis added). This five step test for review was expressly followed
in American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 830-31 (3d Cir. 1978).
54. 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978).
55. Id. at 831. See also International Harvestor Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, 444 F.2d
841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
56. 577 F.2d at 835. This test is somewhat analogous to a constitutional analysis of "rational
basis." The substantial evidence test, on the other hand, would parallel "strict scrutiny." See
generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994, 1000 (1978).
57. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
58. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 835 (3d Cir. 1978). See Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974). "What we are entitled
to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary . . .of the reasons why he chooses to
follow one course rather than another." Id. at 475.
"[O]ur review basically must determine whether the Secretary carried out his essentially legislative task in a manner reasonable under the state of the record before him." Florida Peach
Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1974).
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of harm to employees. 9 In FloridaPeach GrowersAssociation v. United

States Department of Labor,60 the fifth circuit reviewed an emergency
OSHA regulation limiting human exposure to residues of organophosphorous pesticides. 6 ' Under the auspices of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, the court concluded that the Secretary could
promulgate emergency regulations to deal with situations involving
grave danger.62 Nevertheless, the court qualified its holding by noting
that danger alone did not always trigger the authority to promulgate
regulations. 63 The court held that reasoned decisionmaking might justify promulgating a standard when the risk involved death, but not if
the risk involved a curable malady. 64 Similarly, the court in United
Parcel Service, Inc. v. OSHA6 5 examined the risk of foot injury to

members of the parcel-handling industry in regard to an OSHA standard which required steel-toed safety shoes. Although acknowledging
that the risk involved was not a de minimis one, the court held:
[I]n view of the nature of petitioner's business, the small sizes
of the vast majority of parcels handled, the extremely low incidence of injuries resulting from falling parcels, and the high
rate of turnover among the affected employees, we think it
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion to require. . . [that
all employees be equipped with] steel-toed safety shoes.6 6
59. The Occupational Safety and Health Act specifically states that the Secretary of Labor
may not promulgate a standard unless it would result in improved health and safety. If no health
or safety risk exists, the Secretary would not be warranted in taking protective measures. 29
U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976).
60. 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974).
61. The Secretary's regulation of twelve named pesticides is published at 38 Fed. Reg. 17,216
(1973).
62. 489 F.2d at 130. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(l)(A) (1976).
63. 489 F.2d at 130.
The need for a serious emergency upon which to ground temporary standards is reflected in words of the Act which require the Secretary to determine "(A) that employees
are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be
toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard
is necessary to protect employees from such danger." The Act requires determination of
dangerfrom exposure to harmful substances, not just a danger of exposure; and not
exposure to just a danger, but to a grave danger, and, not the necessity of just a temporary standard, but that an emergency standard is necessary.
Id. (emphasis in original).
64. We reject any suggestion that deaths must occur before health and safety standards
may be adopted. Nevertheless, the danger of incurable, permanent or fatal consequences
to workers, as opposed to easily curable and fleeting effects on their health, becomes
important in the consideration of the necessity for emergency measures to meet a grave
danger.
Id. at 132.
65. 570 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1978).
66. Id. at 812.
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In cases dealing with hazardous substances whose effects are not
precisely known, the courts have exhibited great deference to the Secretary's statement of the risk involved.6 7 American Iron & Steel Institute

v. OSHA 61 acknowledged the concept of a "socially acceptable risk,"

when elimination of any risk was impossible.6 9 In that case, the Secre-

tary determined that coke oven emissions caused human cancer and
that there was no known safe exposure level. Therefore, "the Secre-

tary's effort to meet a perceived health need by establishing an exposure limit to coke oven emissions was proper."70 The court reasoned
that in cases where a risk cannot be eliminated, it is up to the Secretary

to make a policy judgment on the basis of the best available evidence. 7 '
In other words, it was the Secretary's duty to determine a socially ac-

ceptable risk. The court noted that even though it may have "drawn
different inferences from the information before the Secretary," as long
as his conclusion reflected a reasoned decision, the court must defer to
72

it.

C.

The FeasibilityIssue

Once the Secretary has identified a grave, socially unacceptable, or
unreasonable risk, he must then show that his proposed risk-reducing
regulation is both technologically and economically feasible. 73 Technological feasibility has not generally been an issue before the courts.
In Society of Plastics,Inc. v. OSHA74 the court noted that OSHA was

to be viewed as a technology-forcing agency dispelling any question of
67. See, e.g., notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
68. 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978).
69. Id. at 832.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 833.
72. Id.
73. Although courts have concluded that technological feasibility may be a consideration,
OSHA is to be viewed as technology forcing. American Fed'n of Labor v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109,
121 (3d Cir. 1975); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1975); cf.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. E.P.A., 489 F.2d 390, 401 (5th Cir. 1974) (construing
the 1970 amendment to the Clean Air Act); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d
659, 674 (6th Cir. 1972) (construing the Clean Air Act). The courts appear to have concluded that
costs short of "massive economic dislocation" do not make a standard economically infeasible.
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 835 (3d Cir. 1978); American Fed'n of Labor
v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 1975); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499
may become evident that a particular safety and health
F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974). "[I]t
standard is economically or technically infeasible ... but only after employers have made a good
faith effort to comply." Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores v. OSHA, 534 F.2d 541, 550 (3d Cir. 1976)
(emphasis added).
74. 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975).
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present technological capabilities.7" Similarly, in American Federation
of Labor v. Brennan,76 the court concluded, "the Secretary would not
be justified in dismissing an alternative to a proposed health and safety
standard as infeasible when the necessary technology looms on today's
horizon."7 7

The Occupational Safety and Health Act and its legislative history
is cloudy on the issue of economic feasibility although this issue has
been frequently presented to the courts.78 In FloridaPeach GrowersAssociation v. UnitedStates DepartmentofLabor,7 9 the court expressed its
uneasiness with the broad authority delegated to the Secretary of Labor
by the Act. It concluded that Congress intended that the Secretary
"delicately exercise" his authority, employing a balancing approach between the protection afforded by the regulation and the regulation's
effect upon "economic and market conditions in the industry. ' 80 As
the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Pesticides8 ' stated, "it is essential that employees be protected against exposure to highly toxic materials, but this should be done without eliminating the agricultural
enterprise and the associated jobs." 2
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson8" also ad-

dressed the issue of economic feasibility and concluded that "practical
considerations can temper protective requirements. Congress does not
appear to have intended to protect employees by putting their employers out of business .... ,,84 Nevertheless, the court cautioned that a
regulation designed to protect employee health could substantially increase production costs and adversely affect profit margins and still be
feasible. 85
[T]he concept of economic feasibility [does not] necessarily
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1308. See note 73 supra.
530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 121.
Id. at 122.
489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 129-30.

81. The Subcommittee was one of several investigative groups convened by the Government
in the 1970's to study the problem of occupational exposure to pesticides. The Subcommittee
concluded, in FloridaPeach Growers, that the Secretary's standard regulating pesticide exposure
was not justified since no emergency condition existed. The Chairman of the Subcommittee resigned following the Secretary's promulgation of the emergency standards, despite the Subcommittee's contrary recommendation. Id. at 129-30.
82. Id. at 130.
83. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

84. Id. at 477-78.
85. .d. at 477.
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guarantee the continued existence of individual employers. It
would appear to be consistent with the purposes of the Act to

envisage the economic demise of an employer who has lagged
behind the rest of the industry in protecting the health and

safety of employees. .. .
This landmark decision effectively eliminated the chance of any suc-

cessful economic defense to a regulation.
Numerous courts have concluded that substantial costs to an in-

dustry-short of massive dislocation-are justifiable in light of the
hazards which OSHA regulations are designed to eliminate.87 In addressing the industry's contention of a regulation's heavy financial burden, the court in American Iron & Steel Institute v. OSHA 88 concluded,
"although we are very sensitive to the financial implications of the stan-

dard and have endeavored to carefully weigh its effect upon the wellbeing of the industry, we are not persuaded that its implementation

would precipitate anything approaching the 'massive dislocation,'
which would characterize an economically infeasible standard."89
III.

INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPA.RTMENT, AFL-CIO J.AMERICAN
PETROLEUM INSTITUTE: THE BILLION DOLLAR BENZENE
BLUNDER

The United States Supreme Court recently scrutinized OSHA's
regulation of toxic emissions to ensure that the agency acted within the
confines of its enabling legislation.9" In doing so, the Court looked to
the Secretary of Labor's rationale for imposing the regulation as well as

the Occupational Safety and Health Act and its legislative history to
examine the congressional parameters of the Secretary's authority. The

Court struck down the regulation holding that OSHA had exceeded its
86. Id. at 478. See also American Fed'n of Labor v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975).
"An economically impossible standard would in all likelihood prove unenforceable, inducing employers faced with going out of business to evade rather than comply with the regulation." Id. at
123.
87. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 836 (3d Cir. 1978); American Fed'n
of Labor v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 1975); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
88. 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 101 S.Ct. 38 (1980).
89. 577 F.2d at 836. OSHA has consistently taken the position, regarding toxic substances,
that no cost-benefit analysis is required. 41 Fed. Reg. 46,742, 46,750-51 (1976), 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1029 (1980) (coke oven emission standard); 39 Fed. Reg. 35,890, 35,892 (1974), 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1017 (1980) (vinyl chloride standard); 37 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (1972), 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001
(1980) (asbestos dust standard).
90. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S.Ct. 2844 (1980)
(Per Justice Stevens, with three Justices joining and one Justice concurring in judgment), a 7'g in
part sub nom. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978).
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regulatory authority.9
Industrial Union Department, the first OSHA standards case to
reach the Supreme Court, dealt with the validity of an occupational
safety and health administration regulation limiting worker exposure to
benzene,12 a hydrocarbon compound suspected of causing leukemia. 93
Benzene had been recognized since 1900 as a toxic substance and its
history had been riddled with regulation. 94 OSHA's past regulatory
scheme was aimed at the non-malignant toxic effects of the substance. 95
In 1977, based upon a leukemia hazard, OSHA severely reduced the 10
ppm 96 standard set in 1971 to 1 ppm effective March 13, 1978. 97 This
reduction, referred to as a billion dollar decision, 98 was challenged by
91. In this case the record makes it perfectly clear that the Secretary relied squarely on a
special policy for carcinogens that imposed the burden on industry of proving the existence of a safe level of exposure, thereby avoiding the Secretary's threshold responsibility
of establishing the need for more stringent standards. In so interpreting his statutory
authority, the Secretary exceeded his power.
I00 S. Ct. at 2873.
92. Benzene (C6 H6 ) is a ubiquitous hydrocarbon compound which occurs naturally in small
quantities and is primarily produced by the petroleum and steel industries. Its production in the
United States is rapidly increasing and at present only II other chemicals and only one other
hydrocarbon are produced in greater quantities. 43 Fed, Reg. 5918 (1978).
The primary use of benzene is as a feedstock in the manufacture of other organic chemicals; it is also used in the manufacture of detergents, pesticides, solvents, and paint, and
as a solvent and reactant in chemical laboratories. Industries currently using benzene
include the chemical, printing, lithograph, rubber cements, rubber fabricating, paint,
varnish, stain removers, adhesives, and petroleum industries.
American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 1978).
93. During the 1970's various studies revealed statistically significant greater risks of leukemia for workers exposed to resins containing the compound, than for the general population. One
study, on which OSHA principally relied, pinpointed exposure to benzene at around 100 ppm
(parts per million parts air averaged over an eight hour work day), and found that the risk of
death from leukemia, among those exposed, was five times greater than the general population.
581 F.2d at 499 n.13. For results of various benzene studies see Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO
v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2852-54 & nn. 8, 9, 12, 15 & 16. For various studies
on the effects of benzene exposure see Infant, Leukemia 4mong Workers Exposed o Benzene, 37
TEx. REP. BIOL. MED. 153 (1978); Krekel, Benzene CancerRisk Demands Cancer Control, 37 TEX.
REP. BIOL. MED., 162 (1978).
94. 581 F.2d at 498. For a history of the regulation of benzene see Industrial Union Dep't
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., I00 S. Ct. 2844, 2851-55 (1980).
95. Such nonmalignant toxic effects include headaches, nausea, breathlessness and nervous
excitation. 581 F.2d at 498. In 1946, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists recommended a maximum exposure limit for benzene of 100 ppm which resulted in a
reduction to 50 ppm in 1947, to 35 ppm in 1948, to 25 ppm in 1963 and to 10 ppm in 1974, OSHA
adopted a 10 ppm standard in 1971 without rulemaking under the authority of 29 U.S.C. § 655(a)
(1976). This standard is codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 Table A-2 (1977).
96. Parts per million parts air averaged over an eight hour work day. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028
(1980).
97. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978).
98. OSHA estimated compliance costs for those affected to include: $187-205 million first
year operating costs, $266 million engineering control costs, and $34 million recurring annual
costs. Although not seriously challenged by the affected industry, petitioners refer to the
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producers and users of benzene alike. This challenge resulted from allegations that the need for the proposed reduction was not supported

by substantial evidence in light of OSHA's failure to conduct a costbenefit analysis to show that the regulation was reasonably related to its

goals. 99 The Fifth Circuit, under its decision in Aqua Slide W' Dive v.
Consumer ProductSafety Commission," vacated the regulation "in absence of substantial evidence indicating that measurable benefits to be
achieved by the reduction . . . bore a reasonable relationship to the
one-half billion dollar cost of such regulation for affected indus-

tries."

01

In a precedential five to four decision, 0

E

the United States

Supreme Court affirmed in part the Fifth Circuit's decision, striking
down the benzene standard.0 3 The Court determined that pursuant to
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Secretary of Labor is only

authorized to promulgate regulations which are "reasonably necessary
or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment or places of

employment."°'4 The Supreme Court construed this provision as placing an affirmative obligation on the Secretary of Labor to make a
promulgation of this standard as a billion dollar decision. 581 F.2d at 503 & n.22. See also Brief
for Respondents at 17 & n.40, id., where this cost estimate is challenged as being significantly
underestimated by as much as $4 billion.
99. The Fifth Circuit concluded that OSHA must assess the expected benefits in light of
the burdens to be imposed by the standard. Although the agency does not have to conduct an elaborate cost-benefit analysis, it does have to determine whether the benefits
expected from the standard bear a reasonable relationship to the costs imposed by the
standard.
Id. at 503 (citations omitted). Accord, Texas Independent Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d
398 (5th Cir. 1980).
100. 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978).
101. 581 F.2d at 493, af'd in part sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 100 S.Ct. 2844 (1980) (the Supreme Court never expressly reached a decision on
the issue of a cost-benefit analysis).
102. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S.Ct. 2844 (1980).
Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stevens, Stewart and Powell concluded that the benzene standard
was invalid. Although siding with the plurality, Justice Rehnquist felt the nondelegation doctrine
should be invoked in this case, "Ji]f we are ever to reshoulder the burden of ensuring that Congress itself make the critical policy decisions.. " Id. at 2886 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Brennan, White and Blackmun dissented, believing the benzene standard valid.
103. The Supreme Court never expressly reached the question whether a reasonable correlation must exist between cost and benefits. It vacated the benzene standard owing to OSHA's
failure to identify a "significant health risk." Id. at 2850. The nation's textile industry recently
raised this unanswered question in a case currently awaiting the Court's decision. American
Fed'n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted,judgment vacated, sub
nom. Cotton Warehouse Ass'n v. Marshall, 101 S.Ct. 56 (1981).
104. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976), provides that "[tihe term 'occupational safety and health standard' means a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices,
means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment." Id.
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threshold finding that a workplace is not safe, in that it threatens work-

ers with a "significant risk of harm."' °5 Because OSHA failed to produce substantial evidence to show that "it is at least more likely than
not that long-term exposure to 10 ppm of benzene [the old standard

uncontested by the users and producers of benzene] presents a significant risk of material health impairment,"'' 0 6 the Secretary of Labor ex-

ceeded his authority under the Occupational Safety and Health Act in
promulgating the reduction of benzene exposure from 10 ppm to 1
ppm. The Supreme Court, perhaps under an outcome determinative
theory,"' ended its inquiry there, concluding:
Unless and until . . . a finding [of a significant health

risk] is made, it is not necessary to address the further question whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that there
must be a reasonable correlation between costs and benefits,
or whether, as the Government argues, the Secretary is then

required [by the Occupational Safety and Health Act] to promulgate a standard that goes as far as technologically
and ec08
onomically possible to eliminate the risk.
105. 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2864 (1980). The Court noted that the identification of a significant
health risk was consistent with the scope of regulatory power delegated to the Secretary in the
toxic substances section, "which empowers the Secretary to promulgate standards, not for chemicals and physical agents generally, but for 'toxic chemicals' and 'harmful physical agents."' Id.
(emphasis in original). The requirement of the identification of a significant risk is supported by
other sections in the Occupational Safety and Health Act. § 655(a) dealing with OSHA standards
states "the Secretary shall. . . by rule promulgate a standard. . . unless he determines that the
promulgation of such a standard would not result in improved safety ....
" 29 U.S.C. § 655(a)
(1976). By negative implication, this language requires that the Secretary make the determination
that his standard will result in improved safety.
Similarly, § 655(g) of the Act, dealing with priority for establishment of standards, states that
"the Secretary shall give due regard to the urgency of the need for mandatory safety and health
standards." 29 U.S.C. § 655(g) (1976). Clearly, then, the Secretary is not authorized to promulgate a standard unless it is needed.
Most supportive of the requirement of significant risk identification is the language of
§ 655(b)(8) of the Act dealing with the procedure for modifying standards. "Whenever a rule
promulgated by the Secretary differs substantially from an existing . . . standard, the Secretary
shall. . . publish. . . a statement of the reasons why the rule as adopted will better effectuate the
purposes [of the Act]. . . than the [existing] standard." 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(8) (1976). The intent
of Congress is clear. If the Secretary changes an existing standard he must demonstrate how the
new standard will improve health and safety. Accord, Texas Independent Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1980); f. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, & Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 136-136y, 136(bb) (1976) (containing a reasonably necessary and appropriate clause which is
treated as a substantive obligation); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056(a),
2058(c)(2)(A) (1976) (containing a reasonably necessary and appropriate clause which is treated as
a substantive obligation).
106. 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2869 (1980).
107. See id. at 2900 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "[T]he plurality is obviously more interested in
the consequences of its decision than in discerning the intention of Congress." Id.
108. Id. at 2850. See also Texas Independent Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398 (5th
Cir. 1980).
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A. Secretary's Rationalefor Imposing Reduction in Benzene Exposure
In order to fully understand the Supreme Court's difficult decision
in this complex case, one must first examine the Secretary of Labor's
rationale for imposing the benzene reduction.

OSHA's rationale for lowering the permissible exposure limit
to 1 ppm was based, not on any finding that leukemia has

ever been caused by exposure to 10 ppm of benzene and that
it will not be caused by exposure to 1 ppm, but rather on a
seriesof assumptions indicating that some leukemias might result from exposure to 10 ppm and that the number of cases
might be reduced by reducing the exposure level to 1 ppm. 0 9

In promulgating the reduction in benzene exposure, OSHA first
unequivocally concluded that benzene caused human cancer." 0 Second, OSHA determined, despite industry studies,"' that the industry
"had failed to prove that there is a safe threshold level of exposure to
benzene below which no excess leukemia cases would occur."' " 2 Third,
and most importantly, OSHA relied on its standard cancer policy,
109. 100 S.Ct. at 2860 (emphasis added). See also Texas Independent Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 409 (5th Cir. 1980).
There are two interpretations of OSHA's actions in promulgating the benzene standard on
the basis of a "lesser exposure is better" rationale. The Fifth Circuit appeared almost outraged
that OSHA would exercise such "unbridled discretion," feeling that the agency had far exceeded
its Congressional mandate. 581 F.2d at 502. The court made the following observations. "[M]ere
rationality is not equivalent to substantial evidence." Id. at 503. "Congress provided that OSHA
regulate on the basis of knowledge rather than on the unknown." -d. at 504. "Congress intended
for OSHA to regulate on the basis of. . .fewer assumptions than this record reflects." Id. at 505.
Although the Fifth Circuit has been severely criticized for requiring OSHA to precisely quantify
the risk prior to taking regulatory action, 100 S.Ct. at 2876; McGarity, supra note 18, at 805-06, it
may merely have been "fighting fire with fire." See note 157 infra.
A more charitable view of OSHA's actions is taken by Professor McGarity. Rather than
deceiving itself and the public by suggesting a non-existant accuracy for a carcinogenic risk assessment, OSHA took a straight forward, honest approach by refusing to play a "numbers game."
McGarity, supra note 18, at 806.
110. 100S. Ct. at 2860; 43 Fed. Reg. at 5931.
The determination of benzene's leukemogenicity is derived from the evaluation of all the
evidence in totality and is not based on any one particular study. OSHA recognizes...
that individual reports vary considerably in quality, and that some investigations have
significant methodological deficiencies. While recognizing the strengths and weaknesses
in individual studies, OSHA nevertheless concludes that the benzene record as a whole
clearly establishes a causal relationship between benzene and leukemia.
Id.
11l.Studies made by the industry revealed no excessive risk of cancer among workers exposed to benzene below levels of 10 ppm. 43 Fed. Reg. at 5930-32. In rejecting the industry
studies OSHA stated that the epidemiological method was "by its very nature relatively crude and
an insensitive measure." Furthermore, OSHA stated that its policy was to hold negative studies to
a higher standard of methodological accuracy. id. at 5931-32.
112. 100 S.Ct. at 2860.
The agency's position is that there is substantial evidence in the record to support its
conclusion that there is no absolute safe level for a carcinogen and that, therefore, the
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"concluding that, in the absence of definitive proof of a safe [exposure]
level, it must be assumed that any level above zero presents some increased risk of cancer.""

3

Fourth, OSHA maintained that, under the

auspices of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, it was mandated
safe level or the lowest
to set a health standard at either a demonstrably
4

feasible level, whichever was higher.1
There is no doubt that benzene is a carcinogen and must, for
the protection and safety of workers, be regulated as such.
Given the inability [of the opponent industry] to demonstrate
a threshold or establish a safe level, it is appropriate that
OSHA prescribe that the permissible 5exposure to benzene be
reduced to the lowest level feasible." 1

burden is properly on industry to prove, apparently beyond the shadow of a doubt, that
there is a safe level for benzene exposure.
Id. at 2869 (emphasis in original). The Court rejected this position noting that the Administrative
Procedure Act placed the burden of proof on the proponent of a rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)
(1976); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (1977).
Congress had shifted the burden of proving a toxic substance unsafe in some cases. See, e.g.,
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 548 F.2d 998, 1012-18
(1977). Because Congress did not shift the burden of proof when enacting OSHA, the Court
concluded that Congress intended OSHA to bear the normal burden of establishing the need for a
standard. 100 S. Ct. at 2870.
113. 100 S. Ct. at 2861 (emphasis in original). The Court noted that in OSHA's published
statement giving notice of the proposed standard, the agency did not ask for comments on whether
an exposure limit of 10 ppm presented a significant health risk. Rather, OSHA asked for comments regarding the feasibility of the I ppm limit. Id. at 2855.
OSHA's Deputy Director articulated the agency's no-risk cancer policy: "Whenever a carcinogen is involved, OSHA will presume that no safe level of exposure exists in the absence of clear
proof establishing such a level and will accordingly set the exposure limit at the lowest level feasible." Id.
The proposed I ppm exposure limit in this case thus was established not on the basis of a
proven hazard at 10 ppm, but rather on the basis of "OSHA's best judgment at the time
of the proposal of the feasibility of compliance with the proposed standard by the affected industries." Given OSHA's cancer policy, it was in fact irrelevant whether there
was any evidence at all of a leukemia risk at 10 ppm. The important point was that there
was no evidence that there was not some risk, however small, at that level.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 831-32
(3d Cir. 1978).
114. 100 S. Ct. at 2861. The Court noted that if OSHA was correct that no safe benzene
exposure level exists, it should have set the exposure level at zero which was feasible for some
industries. But, OSHA set the exposure at I ppm, largely as a matter of administrative convenience. This would appear at odds with OSHA's firm stand that its empowering legislation
prescribes that it "assure so far as possible" the health and safety of the American worker. Id. at
2868.
115. 43 Fed. Reg. 5932 (1978).
There is general agreement that even in the absence of the ability to establish a "threshold" or "safe" level for benzene and other carcinogens, a dose response relationship is
likely to exist; that is, exposure to higher doses carries with it a higher risk of cancer, and
conversely, exposure to lower levels is accompanied by a reduced risk, even though a
precise quantitative relationship cannot be established.
Id. at 5940.
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OSHA determined that I ppm was the lowest workable exposure

level, 16 and then determined that such a standard was both technologically and economically feasible." 7
Finally, although OSHA maintained it was under no mandate to

conduct any analysis of the benefit to be gained from the proposed reduction in the level of benzene exposure, it did conclude "that benefits

from the reduction 'may be appreciable.' "118 Nowhere in its findings
did OSHA acknowledge any duty to promulgate a standard which was
"reasonably necessary or appropriate" to provide a safe place of employment."19 This formed the basic legal issue before the Supreme
Court.
B.

The OccupationalSafety and Health Act

The decision in IndustrialUnion Department resulted from judicial
review of intricate policy questions 20 construing the Secretary's statu-

tory authority under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The
controversy focused on the meaning of and relationship between two

key provisions of the Act.' 2' Section 652(8) of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act defines the type of standard that OSHA is authorized to

promuglate as one which is "reasonably necessary or appropriate" to
assure safe places of employment. 122 Section 655(b)(5) of the Act di-

rects the Secretary to provide safety and health standards for toxic
materials. In doing so, the Secretary shall "set the standard which most
adequatelyassures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best avail-

able evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of
116. "Because of benzene's importance to the economy, no one has ever suggested that it
would be feasible to eliminate its use entirely, or to try to limit exposures to the small amounts
that are omnipresent." 100 S. Ct. at 2861-62.
117. OSHA has consistently taken the position regarding economic feasibility that anything
short of financial ruination of the affected industry is feasible. Id. at 2877; 43 Fed. Reg. 5939-41
(1978). The Secretary has consistently taken the position that a toxic substance will be regulated
at the lowest feasible level and that he is not required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g.,
41 Fed. Reg. 46,742, 46,750-51 (1976) (coke oven emission standard); 39 Fed. Reg. 35,890, 35,892
(1974) (vinyl chloride standard); 37 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (1972) (asbestos dust standard).
118. 43 Fed. Reg. 5939, 5941 (1978).
119. 100 S. Ct. at 2862.
120. Justice Marshall pointed out the factors that make judicial review in this case so difficult.
First, the issues involved in the federal regulation of benzene are both technical and highly complex. Second, the factual issues involved are not, at this time, subject to definitive, quantifiable
resolution. Third, the issues involved the determination of "an acceptable risk," a decision which
out of necessity must be based on policy considerations. Id. at 2896 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2862.
122. See note 10 supra.
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health ....,

OSHA argued that section 652(8) of the Act merely

required that a regulation bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose
set out in the substantive provisions of the Act.124 OSHA maintained
that section 652(8) was reasonably related to the purpose of section
655(b)(5) which requires "OSHA to promulgate a standard that either

gives an absolute assurance of safety for each and every worker or that
reduces exposures to the lowest level feasible."' 2 5 OSHA argued, again

supported by case law, that the "feasibility" language of this section
merely required
it to stop short of financial ruination of the affected
12 6
industry.

The respondent industry placed foremost emphasis on the definitional section of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. "The Act
imposes on OSHA the obligation to enact only standards that are reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful workplaces. If a standard does not fit this definition, it is not one that OSHA
is authorized to enact."' 2 7 The industry argued that the "reasonably

necessary or appropriate" language of the definitional section of the
Act was incorporated by reference into the toxic substances section of
the Act, and that the two sections must be read conjunctively.12 8 Fur-

thermore, the industry viewed the "reasonably necessary or appropriate
language" coupled with the "feasibility" requirement of the toxic substances section of the Act to require "the Agency to quantify both the
costs and the benefits of a proposed rule and to conclude that they are
123. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
The Secretary in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to
the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has
regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working
life. Development of standards under this subsection shall be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as may be appropriate. In addition
to the attainment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee,
other considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility
of the standards, and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws.
Whenever practicable, the standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of objective
criteria and of the performance desired.
Id.

124. 100 S.Ct. at 2862-63, 2897.
125. Id. at 2863.

126. Id. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
127. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 1978). Accord, Texas
Independent Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1980); Aqua Slide 'N' Dive v.
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978). But see American Fed'n of
Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted,judgment vacated sub nom. Cotton

Warehouse Ass'n v. Marshall, 101 S.Ct. 56 (1981).
128. 100 S.Ct. at 2864.
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roughly commensurate."' 2 9 "[W]ithout an estimate of benefits sup-

ported by substantial evidence, OSHA is unable to justify a finding that
the benefits to be realized from the standard bear a reasonable relation1
ship to its one-half billion dollar price tag."' 30

1. Legislative History
Both OSHA and the users and producers of benzene cited extensively to the legislative history of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act in support of their respective positions. Justice Marshall in his eloquent dissent stated that the legislative history of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act' "reveals Congress' particular concern for
health hazards of 'unprecedented complexity' that had resulted from
chemicals whose toxic effects 'are only now being discovered.' "132 Justice Marshall further stated that one of the primary purposes of the Act
"was to ensure regulation of. . . insidious silent killers" such as benzene.' 3 3 Accordingly, it was Congress' special concern which
culminated in the enactment of the toxic substances section of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.' 34 Furthermore, the overall purpose

and aim of the Occupational Safety and Health Act was clearly "to
assure sofar aspossible every working man and woman in the Nation
129. Id. at 2863. But see Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), where the Court stressed the limited nature of judicial intrusion upon an
agency action on review.
130. 581 F.2d at 503.
131.
The on-the-job health and safety crisis is the worst problem confronting American workers, because each year, as a result of their jobs, over 14,500 workers die. In only
four years' time, as many people have died because of their employment as have been
killed in almost a decade of American involvement in Vietnam. Over two million workers are disabled annually through job-related accidents.
The economic impact of occupational accidents and diseases is overwhelming. Over
$1.5 billion is wasted in lost wages, and the annual loss to the Gross National Product is
over $8 billion. Ten times as many man-days are lost from job-related disabilities as
from strikes, and days of lost productivity through accidents, and illnesses are ten times
greater than the loss from strikes.
FELLNER & SAVELSON, supra note 9, at 3 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15
(1970)).
132. 100 S. Ct. at 2889 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Const., 2d
Sess., 2 (1970)).
133. 100 S. Ct. at 2889 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. Id. The toxic substances section was designed to implement three legislative purposes.
First, Congress desired to provide protection from substances that become dangerous only upon
repeated or frequent exposure. Second, by the use of the term "best available," Congress intended to ensure that the Secretary could promulgate standards even in the absence of specific,
quantifiable evidence. Third, "Congress' special concern for the 'silent killers' was felt to justify
an especially strong directive to the Secretary in the standard-setting process." Id. at 2889-90
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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safe and healthful working conditions."' 35
The affected industry took a less emotionally laden view of the
legislative history of the provisions at issue. For example, the industry
noted that the original version of the toxic substances section provided
that the Secretary promulgate standards to ensure that "no employee
will suffer any impairment."'' 36 This section was amended from "any
impairment" to "material impairment."'' 37 The industry concluded
that the amendment reflected Congress' cognizance
of the futility of
t38
rendering all workplaces absolutely riskfree.
In contrast to OSHA's emphasis on its congressional mandate to
ensure safe places of employment, 39 the industry emphasized Conthe Secretary of Labor too much
gress' repeated concern over allowing
40
power over American industry.
Congress refused to give the Secretary the power to shut down
plants unilaterally because of imminent danger. . . and narrowly circumscribed the Secretary's power to issue temporary
emergency standards. This effort by Congress to limit the
Secretary's power is not consistent with a view that the mere
possibility that some employee somewhere in the country may
confront some risk of cancer is a sufficient basis for the exerof
cise of the Secretary's power to require the expenditure
4
hundreds of millions of dollars to minimize that risk.' 1

IV.

ANALYSIS

The United States Supreme Court in IndustrialUnion Department
confronted a very difficult and delicate issue: "whether the statistical
possibility of future deaths should ever be disregarded in light of the
economic costs of preventing those deaths."' 42 The Court addressed
135. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
136. S. REP. No. 91-2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 40 (1970).
137. 100 S.Ct. at 2867. OSHA argued that this change merely meant that it is not required to
promulgate standards dealing with immaterial or insignificant risks, However, OSHA is still re-

quired by 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) to promulgate standards ensuring "that not even one employee will be subject to any risk ofserious harm-no matter how small that risk may be." 100 S.
Ct. at 2864.
138. 100 S. Ct. at 2867.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
140. 100 S.Ct. at 2869.
141. Id. (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 2879. Recent reports indicate that the cancer rate in the United States is rising
following thirty years of stability, and toxic chemicals may be a factor in one-fifth of all cases.
The incidence of cancer rose 10% between 1970 and 1976 and it now ranks as the number 2 cause
of death in the United States causing 400,000 deaths annually. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY
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this issue by holding that the Secretary of Labor must identify a significant health risk, one which the reasonable person would find unacceptable, as a condition precedent to regulatory action. 143 But, is this a
satisfactory answer" and does the holding in Industrial Union Department provide appropriate guidance for future judicial challenges to

agency regulatory policies regarding risks looming on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge? Or, was the decision in this case outcome determinative with the Court balancing the possibility of death against the
death and concluding that the costs did not
extravagant cost to prevent
45
justify the benefits?

Precedent reveals a trend away from the substantial evidence test
on judicial review of an agency's actions when research and data are
necessarily lacking in an area.' 46 The "test" applied where the Secre-

tary's actions have been, by necessity, based on policy considerations8

47
has been termed "the reasonableness test,"' "the arbitrariness test,"14
the "some consistency between the standard and the Act test,"' 14 9 or the
"free from nagging doubt test."' 5 0 It should be noted that although the

courts agree that the substantial evidence test is inapplicable where policy decisions are involved,'

each court which has faced the issue has

developed a test of its own based on the facts and circumstances before
it. Yet, a review of the case law would reveal that, in each case, the

court has really applied a "rational basis test" merely to ensure that the
Secretary has not acted arbitrarily or irrationally."

2

Indeed, one might

THE Toxic SUBSTANCES STRATEGY COMMITTEE ON Toxic CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PROTECTION,

xiii, xxxvii, 149-151 (1980) (report on file in TULSA LAW JOURNAL Offices).
OSHA generic cancer regulations are estimated to cost affected industries as much as $88
billion and they are expected to increase inflation by up to one percent. 1 CHEM. REo. REP.2020
(1978) (copy on file in TULSA LAW JOURNAL offices).
143. See notes 104-06 supra and accompanying text.
144. See notes 181-82 infra and accompanying text.
145. See note 191 infra and accompanying text.
146. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
147. Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.
1974); Colonial Stores v. FTC, 450 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1971); Cusson v. Policemen's Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 524 S.W.2d 88 (rex. Civ. App. 1975, no writ).
148. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See notes
42-43 supra and accompanying text.
149. Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfgs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974). See
notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
150, American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 834 (3d Cir. 1978).
151. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text. "The traditional 'substantial evidence' test
is almost impossible of application where. . . the Secretary's decision-making is essentially legislative in character." Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1304 (2d Cir. 1975).
See also Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
152. Elevating the substantial evidence standard beyond its rational basis interpretation, the
Fifth Circuit, in a recent decision following IndustrialUnionDep ', clarified the appropriate scope
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argue that this is all the so-called "substantial evidence" test entails. 53
At first glance it appears that the Court in IndustrialUnion Department departed from this prior level of scrutiny where deference was
granted to the Secretary's decision as long as it was rationally base. 5 4

The Supreme Court most certainly departed from prior precedent' 55perhaps to the point of engaging in judicial legislation-by interpreting
the "reasonably necessary or appropriate clause" as imposing upon the
Secretary of Labor an affirmative duty to identify a "significant health
risk" as a condition precedent to regulatory action.' 56 The Court
of judicial intrusion. "The reasonably necessary or appropriate clause does not merely require
that OSHA standards must be rational, because Congress added the limitation that standards
must be 'necessary or appropriate' to the reasonableness limitation." Texas Independent Ginners
Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 409 (5th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
153. Professor McGarity would draw a somewhat different conclusion:
Standards of judicial review for agency decisionmaking have ranged from "rational basis," when the reviewing court essentially accepts as true whatever facts are necessary to
support an agency decision, to "de novo," when the reviewing court decides all facts
anew. Recent legislative and scholarly interest has concentrated upon the difficult distinction between two middle-range standards: "arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion," and "unsupported by substantial evidence. . . on the record." Commentators
have argued forcefully that the true distinction between these two standards lies in the
procedures utilized in compiling the administrative record.
McGarity, supranote 18, at 791. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text. See also Scalia &
Goodman, supra note 36, at 934-35.
154. See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607 (1966), where the Court concluded that substantial evidence
is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's
finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Congress was very deliberate in
adopting this standard of review. It frees the reviewing courts of the time-consuming
and difficult task of weighing evidence, it gives proper respect to the expertise of the
administrative tribunal.
Id. at 620-21. Accord, American Fed'n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651 n.66 (D.C. Cir.
1979). Most recently, in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 100 S.Ct. 883 (1980), the Supreme Court
concluded that any inquiry into statutory purposes should be "informed by an awareness that the
regulation is entitled to deference unless it can be said not to be a reasoned and supportable
interpretation of the Act." Id. at 890. See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
155. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 796-97
(1978); Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1976); Thorpe v. Housing
Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969). But see Texas Independent Ginners Ass'n v.
Marshall, 630 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1980); D.D. Bean & Sons v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n,
574 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1978); Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 569
F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978).
156. Moday's decision represents a usurpation of'decisionmaking authority that has been
exercised by and properly belongs with Congress and its authorized representatives. The
plurality's construction has no support in the statute's language, structure, or legislative
history. The threshold finding that the plurality requires is the plurality's own invention.
It bears no relationship to the acts or intentions of Congress, and it can be understood
only as reflecting the personal views of the plurality as to the proper allocation of resources for safety in the American workplace.
100 S.Ct. at 2899-2900 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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appears to have done so, in part, in direct response to OSHA's having
promulgated the benzene regulation on the basis of its special carcinogen policy."17 This policy is not without logical appeal. In the absence
of conclusive, quantifiable data or a showing to the contrary, lesser exposure to a carcinogen is better.1 58 As a result, in this case, benzene
will be regulated at the lowest technologically feasible level which will
not result in the affected industry's financial ruination. 159 OSHA's carcinogen policy was not formally adopted and it is not statutorily mandated.' 60 But, as the Supreme Court in this case has clearly concluded,
a regulation supported merely by assumptions and logical appeal exceeds OSHA's regulatory authority.
A.

The "SignificantHealth Risk" ThresholdRequirement

1. Creation
Close examination of the plurality's interpretation that section
652(8) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act requires the Secretary of Labor to make a threshold finding of a "significant health risk"
as a condition precedent to regulatory action' 6' reveals that this finding
has little practical effect. Its value may lie, however, in the process by
which it was reached.
The plurality derived its requirement of the identification of a significant health risk from the definitional clause of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act which describes an OSHA standard as one
"which requires conditions.

reasonably necessary or appropiate to
provide safe or healthful employment .... ,162 The plurality con. .

strued this to imply that "before promulgating any standard the Secretary must make a finding that the workplaces in question are not
safe." ' 63 Further, a workplace cannot be considered unsafe unless it
157. See notes 109-118 supra and accompanying text. It may be said that the Court was

"fighting fire with fire." Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1310 (2d Cir.
1975). By imposing the requirement of a "significant health risk," the Court brought to the
agency's attention its rejection of the "special carcinogen policy." 100 S. Ct. at 2861.
158. "The general agreement in the scientific community that exposure to carcinogens at low
levels is safer than exposure at higher levels permits the further factual deduction that reducing
the permissible exposure limit from 10 ppm to I ppm will result in some benefit." American
Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1978).
159. See notes 110-15 supra and accompanying text.
160. 100 S. Ct. at 2865. OSHA has adopted a formal policy for regulating carcinogens effective April 21, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 5002 (1980). See also McGarity, supra note 18, at 754-59.
161. See notes 104-06 supra and accompanying text.
162. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
163. 100 S. Ct. at 2864. The plurality noted that "'safe' is not the equivalent of 'risk-free,'"

and that the Occupational Safety and Health Act "was not designed to require employers to pro-

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss2/5

26

Grove: The Billion Dollar Benzene Blunder: Supreme Court Scrutinizes OSH
TULSA LAW JOUIVAL
[Vol. 16:252

threatens workers with a significant risk of harm.164
Justice Stevens writing for the plurality concluded that "there is no

reason why § 3(8)'s definition of a standard should not be deemed incorporated by reference into § 6(b)(5)," the toxic substances section of

the Act. 165 Justice Stevens noted that the toxic substances section uses
the term "standard" without suggesting any deviation from, or qualification of, the general definition of a standard. 166 Thus, the plurality
concluded that the Secretary of Labor must identify a significant health
risk when promulgating regulations dealing with toxic substances.
"Reasonably necessary or appropriate" clauses have been routinely inserted in regulatory legislation and they have, in the past, been
considered to be general provisos merely evidencing Congress' intent
that a regulation be reasonably related to the objective of the Act. 167
For example, while OSHA could regulate farm worker contact with
pesticides as being reasonably necessary to public health, it could not
regulate the price of grain as being so related.

Justice Marshall, in dissent, noted the plurality's apparent reversal
of the traditional rules of construction.

68

He noted that the plurality

inserted a threshold requirement into a general definitional clause
which effectively superseded the specific language of a substantive pro-

vision. 169 "The plurality's interpretation renders utterly superfluous the
first sentence . . of [the toxic substances section] which . . requires
the Secretary to set the standard 'which most adequately assures...
vide absolutely risk-free workplaces. . . [r]ather, both the language and structure of the Act, as
well as its legislative history, indicate that it was intended to require the elimination, as far as
feasible, of significant risks of harm." Id.
164. The Court noted that "[t]here are many activities that we engage in every day-such as
driving a car or even breathing city air--that entail some risk of accident or material health impairment; nevertheless, few people would consider these activities 'unsafe.'" Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
-167. Id. at 2897. See note 155 supra and accompanying text. See general , United States v.
Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784 (1969).
168. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 381, 394-95 (1974) where the
Court held that a "necessary and appropriate" clause did not authorize the FPC "to set at naught
an explicit provision of the Act," or "ignore the specific mandates" of a substantive provision of
the Natural Gas Act. Id See also Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1947).
The Court, in other cases has stated that statutory ambiguities should be resolved in favor of
safety rather than costs. Eg., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 133 (1977);
Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 469 (1972).
169. "The Court has never-until today-interpreted a 'reasonably necessary or appropriate'
clause as having a substantive content that supersedes a specific congressional directive embodied
in a provision that is focused more particularly on an ageftcy's authority." 100 S. Ct. at 2897
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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that no employee will suffer material impairment of health.' ",170 In
contravention of congressional intent, the plurality had in effect, according to Justice Marshall, supplanted the test for standards regulating toxic substances with the test for standards generally. 7 '
Engaging in judicial legislation, it would appear that, in this case,
the Supreme Court deviated from precendent in finding that a significant health risk is a condition precedent to regulatory action. Indeed, it
is the Court's method of arriving at the significant health risk threshold
requirement that has caused the greatest fervor. This may evidence a
new advent of judicial activisim in OSHA rulemaking.
2. The Effect of a "Significant Health Risk"
The threshold requirement of a significant health risk means that
the Secretary must rationally demonstrate on the basis of the best available evidence that it is "more likely than not" that a risk is significant.' 72 It is the agency's responsibility, however, to determine what it
considers significant.173 This requirement is not to be seen as a "mathematical straightjacket" requiring precise quantification of a risk."' 4
regulatory action when
The Secretary is not prevented from taking
75
quantification of the benefits is impossible.'
The threshold finding of a significant health risk is not an absolute
theory, but a comparative one. 176 As the Court pointed out:
Some risks are plainly acceptable and others plainly unacceptable. If, for example, the odds are one in a billion that a
person will die from cancer by taking a drink of chlorinated
water, the risk clearly could not be considered significant. On
the other hand, if the odds are one in a thousand that regular
inhalation of gasoline vapors that are two percent benzene
will be fatal, a reasonable person might well consider the risk
significant and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate
it. Although the agency has no duty to calculate the exact
probability of harm, it does have an obligation to find that a
significant risk is present before it can characterize a place of
170. Id. at 2898 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2869, 2871.
173. Id. at 2871.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2901 (Powell, J., concurring).
176. Justice Powell noted, "[thousands of toxic substances present risks that fairly could be
characterized as 'significant.'" Id.at 2878 (Powell, J., concurring).
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employment as "unsafe."' 77
The fact that the Secretary is to regulate on the basis of "the best
available evidence,"' 78 requires judicial deference to his findings when
they are made on the frontiers of scientific knowledge.' 79 Justice Stevens concluded that, as long as OSHA's findings "are suported by a
body of reputable scientific thought, the Agency is free to use conservative assumptions in interpreting the data with respect to carcinogens,
risking error on the side of over-protection rather than under-protection."'8 10
Upon close scrutiny, the significant health risk threshold requirement has little practical effect. The Court appears to be saying that
while OSHA cannot withstand judicial scrutiny when it promulgates
standards using a "lesser exposure is better" rationale, 18 it may do so
by reviewing the best available evidence and concluding on the basis of
conservative assumptions that the same standard is necessary.

82

Jus-

tice Marshall exposed the effect of the Court's significant health risk
threshold requirement.
The Court might thus allow the Secretary to attempt to make
a very rough quantification of the risk imposed by a carcinogen substance, and give considerable deference to his finding
that the risk was significant. If so, the Court would permit the
Secretary to promulgatepreciselythe same regulation involved
in this case if he had not relied on a carcinogen "policy," but
undertaken a review of the evidence and the expert testimony
assumptions, that
and concluded, on the basis of conservative
83
the risk addressed is a significant one.
177. Id. at 2871.
178. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
179. See Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1975); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-77 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Federal
Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972) where the Court stated that
"well-reasoned expert testimony-based on what is known and uncontradicted by empirical evidence-may in and of itself be 'substantial evidence' when firsthand evidence on the question...
is unavailable." Id. at 464-65.
180. 100 S. Ct. at 2871.
181. Id. at 2901.
182. See notes 172-76 supra and accompanying text.
183. I00 S. Ct. at 2901 (emphasis added) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Also see Chief Justice
Burger's concurring opinion where he states:
Our holding that the Secretary must retrace his steps with greater care and consideration
is not to be taken in derogation of the scope of legitimate agency discretion. When the
facts and arguments have been presented and duly considered, the Secretary must make
a policy judgment as to whether a specific risk of health impairment is significant in
terms of the policy objectives of the statute. When he acts in this capacity, pursuant to
the legislative authority delegated by Congress, he exercises the prerogatives of the
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This may be largely an exercise in semantics. The significance of this
decision, however, may lie not in what the Court said but in what it
did.
B.

The Significant Risk Strawman: Is it a Frontfor Requiring a
Cost-Benefit Analsis?

Although the Supreme Court refused to go on record as requiring
OSHA to conduct a cost-benefit analysis,' 84 its lengthy opinion reveals

that the Court, in fact, conducted such an analysis.1 85 Regarding costs,
the Court concluded, "as presently formulated, the benzene standard is

an expensive way of providing some additional protection for a relatively small number of employees."' 8 6 OSHA's own figures revealed

that only 35,000 employees would gain any "benefit" from a reduction87
in benzene exposure at a compliance cost of one-half billion dollars.1
Regarding benefits, the Court concluded that OSHA's evidence
"demonstrated. . .ample justification for regulating occupational exposure to benzene and that the prior limit of 10 ppm. . . was reason-

able. It does not, however, provide direct support for the agency's
' 88
conclusion that the limit should be reduced from 10 ppm to 1 ppm."'
Furthermore, although OSHA rejected its findings, 8 9 the industry produced testimony that "a dose-response curve could be constructed on
the basis of the reported epidemiological studies and that this curve

indicated that reducing the permissible exposure limit from 10 to 1
ppm would prevent at most one leukemia and one other cancer death
legislature. . . to promulgate regulations that, to some, may appear as imprudent policy
or inefficient allocation of resources.
Id. at 2875 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also note 203 infra.
184. See note 108 supra and accompanying text. "Because the Secretary did not make the
required threshold finding [of significant health risk] in this case, we have no occasion to deter...100 S. Ct. at 2863. See also id. at
mine whether costs must be weighed against benefits.
2903.
185. Justice Marshall noted that "the responsibility to scrutinize federal administrative action
does not authorize this Court to strike its own balance between the costs and benefits of occupational safety standards." Id. at 2905 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

186. Id.at 2857.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. The Court acknowledged three possible reasons for OSHA's refusal to accept industry
findings: OSHA thought it probable that more lives would actually be saved; OSHA thought that
saving two lives every six years alone justified the adoption of a new standard; or even if the two
lives were not considered significant, OSHA thought it was under a statutory duty to set the most
protective standard that is technologically and economically feasible. The Court further noted
that OSHA, in this case, appeared to rely on the third "drastic" theory which was not supported
by any express findings of fact. Id. at 2870.
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every six years."' 90 The Supreme Court may have come to the conclusion that OSHA sought to require expenditures totaling one-half billion
dollars to prevent thepossibiliy of two cancer deaths every six years in

its quest for utopian workplaces.'l9
Justice Powell went on record, in his concurring opinion, as re-

192
quiring OSHA to conduct a cost-benefit analysis.
I conclude that the statute also requires the agency to deter-

mine that the economic effects of its standard bear a reason-

able relationship to the expected benefits. An occupational
health standard is neither "reasonably necessary" nor "feasi-

ble," as required by statute, if it calls for expenditures wholly
disproportionate to the expected health and safety benefits. 193

The plurality may have actually agreed with Justice Powell.
Inflation in this country is a top priority concern.' 94 The effect of
190. Id. at 2860.
191. This may have been precisely what Chief Justice Burger had in mind when he concluded:
"When the administrative record reveals only scant or minimal risk of material health impairment, responsible administration calls for avoidance of extravagant, comprehensive regulation.
Perfect safety is a chimera; regulation must not strangle human activity in the search for the
impossible." Id. at 2875 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
192. Id. at 2877 (Powell, J., concurring). But see American Fed'n of Labor v. Marshall, 617
F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (where the court specifically stated that no cost-benefit analysis was
required), cert. grantedjudgment vacated, sub nom. Cotton Warehouse Ass'n v. Marshall, 101 S.
Ct. 56 (1981).
OSHA contends that a [cost-benefit] analysis is not required. OSHA argues that the
OSH Act constrains its regulation of dangerous substances "only by the limits of feasibility." We agree. We also find that no additional constraint is imposed by the Act's definition of a health or safety standard as "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide
safe or healthful employment." The language of the Act and the clear intention of Congress permit no other conclusion.
Id. at 663 (emphasis in original). The court went on to state that Congress, itself, struck the
balance between costs and benefits when it added the toxic substances provision to the Act which
specifically provides that the Secretary set a standard which ensures that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health. Congress concluded that health protection benefits warranted any
expense in providing an "effective standard." Id. at 663-64. See also South Terminal Corp. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 504 F.2d 646, 655-57, 676 n.33 (1st Cir. 1974).
193. 100 S.Ct. at 2877 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell expressed concern that he felt
the plurality in this case did not go far enough.
OSHA contends that § 6(b)(5) not only permits but actually requires it to promulgate standards that reduce health risks without regard to economic effects, unless those
effects would cause widespread dislocation throughout an entire industry. Under the
threshold test adopted by the plurality today, this authority will exist only with respect to
"significant" risks. But the plurality does not reject OSHA's claim that it must reduce
such risks without considering economic consequences less serious than massive dislocation. In my view, that claim is untenable.
Id.
194. It is of interest to note that when Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health
Act inflation was not a problem of the magnitude that it is today. Rather, Congress was preeminently concerned with worker health and safety. See note 131 supra. It may well be that if the Act
were considered today, Congress would expressly provide for a balancing approach. But, as the
Court in Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), cautioned, "[i]t
is not for us to
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inflationary regulations on the viability of American industry and the

national economy might have reached such a critical position that the
Court felt compelled to balance the value of a human life against the
cost to protect that life. As Justice Powell expressed it,
[t]he economic health of our highly industrialized society re-

quires a high rate of employment and an adequate response to
increasingly vigorous foreign competition. There can be little

doubt that Congress intended OSHA to balance reasonably
conthe societal interest in health and safety with the often1 95
national economy.

flicting goal of maintaining a strong

Close examination of the Court's extensive opinion reveals that the
Court conducted a cost-benefit analysis' 96 and concluded that the bene-

fits to be gained by the reduction in benzene exposure did not justify
the costs involved.' 97 Yet, the court may have felt compelled by inevi-

table unfavorable public opinion to avoid going on record with its results.' 98 Instead, it created a significant risk strawman' 9 9 to camouflage

its actions while achieving its desired objective. 2°" But, the message
remains clear: the statistical possibility of loss of human life has been
balanced against the cost of preventing the loss of that life.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Industrial Union Department faced an ad-

mittedly difficult task in its review of OSHA's benzene regulation. The
effects of benzene exposure on humans are presently indefinable due
to an absence of empirically verifiable data. OSHA promulgated

the benzene regulation on the basis of a complex, scientific policy
speculate, much less act, on whether Congress would have altered its stance had the specific events
of this case been anticipated." Id. at 185. See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), where the Court stated:
The fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress and in the state
legislatures are not subject to reexamination in the federal courts under the guise of
judicial review of agency action. Time may prove wrong the decision to develop nuclear
energy, but it is Congress or the States within their appropriate agencies which must
eventually make that judgment.
Id. at 558 (emphasis in original).
195. 100 S.Ct. at 2878 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
196. See notes 186-190 supra and accompanying text.
197. See notes 191 supra and accompanying text.
198. The Court may have felt bound by its decision in Vermont Yankee where it concluded
that if neither Congress nor an administrative agency formally required a cost-benefit analysis, it
had no authority to do so. See note 194 supra. See also Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978).
199. See notes 181-83 supra and accompanying text.
200. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
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determination. Such policy decisions are exceedingly difficult for a
court to review.2° '
The Supreme Court boldly agreed for the first time to scrutinize
the type of standard OSHA is authorized to promulgate in uncertain,
scientific areas. Its decision in this case was bound to be unpopular. Its
holding and rationale had to be worded carefully and skillfully to enable astute litigants to ascertain the outcome of future challenges of this
kind.
The Court, in a five-four decision, held that the benzene standard
was unenforceable. It purported to do so because the standard was
based on OSHA's unadopted carcinogen policy, espousing a "lesser exposure is better" rationale. The Court concluded that this was arbitrary
and capricious
action and not "the stuff of which substantial evidence is
202
made.
It appears that the decision reached in Industrial Union Department was outcome determinative. The Supreme Court conducted an
independent cost-benefit analysis and gave greater deference to concerns of economic feasibility than had ever been evidenced before. It
concluded that the benzene reduction was an expensive way of possibly
saving a few lives. Yet, the highest court in this nation may have felt
bound by the inevitable likelihood of unfavorable public opinion to
veil its actual findings. By camouflaging its true decision, it created a
strawman in its requirement of the threshold identification of a significant health risk. Upon close analysis this requirement has little practical effect. It undoubtedly will make OSHA appear more responsible
because the agency will have to explicitly reveal its data and conclusions. Manipulating numbers, however, is not a difficult task.20 3
The true significance of this decision may lie in what the Court
actually did, not in what it said. The Court's cost-benefit analysis implies a higher standard of intrusion that may signal a new advent in
judicial activism in administrative rulemaking.
Were the Supreme Court's actions really indicative of a willingness to more actively intrude in OSHA rulemaking? Or were they re201. See McGarity, supra note 18, at 749.
202. Aqua Slide 'N' Dive v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831, 843 (5th Cir.
1978).
203. See Justice Marshall's comment that to require the Secretary to make a quantitative
showing of a "significant risk" would force "him to deceive the public by acting on the basis of
assumptions that must be considered too speculative to support any realistic assessment of the
relevant risk." 100 S.Ct. at 2901 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also McGarity, supra note 18, at
806.
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flective of judicial restraint, as evidenced by the Court's imposition of a
requirement that may have little practical effect? Ultimately, the question is whether the sepulchral "significant risk" strawman will be
pierced to reveal a palpable cost-benefit condition precedent to OSHA
rulemaking. 2 4
PatriciaL. Grove

204. Interestingly enough, the requirement and efficacy of a cost-benefit analysis was
presented to the Court following the IndustrialUnion Dep't decision, however certiorariwas dismissed on the issue, leaving its interpretation to the circuits. American Iron & Steel Inst. v.
OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 38 (1980). Recently, the nation's
textile industry again presented this issue to the Court challenging the extraordinarily severe and
costly cotton dust standard. American Fed'n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. granted,judgment vacated sub nom. Cotton Warehouse Ass'n v. Marshall, 101 S. Ct. 56
(1981).
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